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Abstract: 
The UK͛s withdrawal from the European Union (EU) is an assertion of UK nation-state 
sovereignty.  Notwithstanding this state-centrism, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland 
have distinct interests to protect as part of the Brexit negotiations.  This article explores how 
the interests of one regional case, Wales, were accommodated in the pre-negotiation phase, 
at a domestic level - through intergovernmental structures - and an EU-level through 
paradiplomacy. We explore the structures for sub-state influence, Wales͛ engagement with 
these structures and what has informed its approach.   We argue that Wales͛ behaviour 
reflects its positioning as a ͚Good Unionist͛ and a ͚Good EuropeaŶ͛.  Despite the weakness of 
intra-UK structures, Wales has preferred to pursue policy influence at a UK (not an EU) 
level.  In Brussels, regional interests inform the context for Brexit. Here, Wales has focused 
on awareness-raising, highlighting that the UK Government does not command the 
͚ŵoŶopoly on perspectives͛ towards Brexit in the UK.   
 
 
Introduction 
International law and politics and their associated structures were created by and for states.  
Acting within a global arena, states seek economic and political advantage through foreign 
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outposts, trade missions, bilateral and multilateral agreements, participation in 
international organisations and, in more extreme cases, military force.  This foreign policy 
realm is one in which the primacy of the state is long established.  However, primacy does 
not imply exclusivity. Indeed, sub-state actors now assert themselves more forcefully on the 
international scene; a scene that has become increasingly hospitable to them.  
 
Though certain states have stood firm against any challenge to exclusive centrality, others 
have transferred administrative and political powers from the centre through models of 
federalism or processes of devolution (Hooghe et al 2016). However, even where 
considerable powers are held by the constituent sub-unit of the state, competence over the 
internal dimension of a policy rarely results in a parallel competence over the external 
dimension. This lack of legal capacity has not deterred sub-states from themselves engaging 
in international activity – in the pursuit of various economic, cultural and political ends – 
whilst seeking to influence state foreign policy through intra-state channels.  The final result 
is a complex foreign policy arena, both within and beyond the state (Duchacek 1990, 
Aldecoa 2009).   
 
In this article, we use the process of the UK͛s withdrawal from the EU to expose and explore 
this multi-layered complexity and gain a better understanding of the ways in which sub-
states are constrained and enabled in the promotion of their own foreign policy 
preferences, both inside and outside the state.  We are particularly interested in the 
structures available for sub-states to advance their policy preferences, the ways in which 
sub-states use these structures, and why.  Our particular focus is Wales. Unlike Scotland, 
Wales͛ electorate voted on 23 June 2016 to leave the EU, though Wales͛ governing parties 
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are staunchly pro-remain. Again unlike Scotland, Wales͛ governing parties are in favour of 
the continuation of the union of the United Kingdom.  
 
Withdrawal from the EU involves the enactment of British state foreign policy that will have 
profoundly differentiated implications across its sub-states. The arena of this foreign policy 
activity, the institutional environment of the EU, is one in which sub-states (as EU ͚Regions͛Ϳ 
have an established presence, legal recognition, and some level of influence. Wales, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland have developed their own independent relationships with 
the EU and each devolved nation has its own set of interests and priorities to protect and 
promote. In particular, Wales has been a net beneficiary of EU funding (Wyn Jones et al 
2016) through the Common Agricultural Policy and the Structural Funds, incorporating as it 
does ͚less deǀeloped͛ areas attracting a higher level of EU support. Its Government also 
emphasises the significance of membership of the Customs Union and Single Market as 
rendering Wales an attractive location for major international companies and for foreign 
direct investment (Minto et al 2016). As with the other sub-state nations in the UK, the 
Welsh GoǀerŶŵeŶt͛s priorities for withdrawal from the EU are markedly different from 
those of the UK Government. However, unlike the other sub-state nations in the UK, Wales͛ 
bargaining hand within the UK is particularly weak. Compounded by the relatively weak 
structures for intergovernmental relations in the UK (House of Lords Select Committee on 
the Constitution 2015), the European arena would appear as a potentially attractive site for 
advocacy activity, advancing Wales͛ distinctive priorities.   
   
Methodology and Hypothesis 
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Our hypothesis is that, if the structures for intergovernmental relations within the UK state 
are weak, Wales would seek to make significant strategic use of external channels to 
represent its interests distinct from those of the UK Government. Our original empirical 
research draws on 19 semi-structured interviews with Welsh and European policy actors, 
based in Wales and Brussels, complemented with documentary analysis of policy texts.1 The 
period under examination runs for a little under 12 months, from the date of the 
referendum vote on 23 June 2016 and finishing before the 2017 General Election. 
Interviews were conducted in April and May 2017. With formal withdrawal negotiations 
between the UK and EU opening on 19 June 2017, this period captures the pre-negotiation 
phase, recognised in diplomacy theory as a period and a process which ͚defiŶes the 
boundaries, shapes the agenda, and affects the outcome of ŶegotiatioŶ͛ (Stein 1989, 232).  
 
We open the article with a presentation of the existing structures for internal UK 
intergovernmental relations through the Joint Ministerial Committees and provide an 
account of the structures developed following the referendum vote.  We demonstrate the 
existing limitations inherent in the system, before going on to present the first set of 
empirical findings from our fieldwork. These findings demonstrate the ways in which, since 
June 23 2016, Wales has used the available opportunity structures internal to the UK to 
advance its interests and seek to influence UK foreign policy with respect to the UK͛s 
withdrawal from the EU.  The findings confirm the limited opportunities for, and 
receptiveness to the advancement of devolved interests, though see Wales as an engaged 
and committed participant in the process.  
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We turn next to the external dimension, highlighting first the generally receptive arena 
presented by the EU institutions for regional (sub-state) interests, and the external activities 
on the part of the regions these encourage. The overlapping of competences involved in the 
day to day governance of EU affairs may result in it being considered as qualitatively 
different from ͚normal͛ foreign policy (Palmer, 2003). However, the high politics involved in 
withdrawing from a treaty arguably removes it from the realm of established practices of 
multilevel governance, albeit not completely. We adopt the concept of paradiplomacy, 
which refers to the direct participation of the sub-state in foreign policy – activities ͚parallel 
to, often coordinated with, complementary to, and sometimes in conflict with centre-to-
centre macro-diploŵaĐǇ͛ (Mitchell 1995, 287). Protodiplomacy meanwhile ͚graft[s] a more 
or less separatist ŵessage͛ onto external sub-state activity (Duchacek 1990, 27). We then 
explore what steps have been taken by Wales directly to use EU-level opportunity 
structures during the period under examination.  
 
We argue that the Welsh GoǀerŶŵeŶt͛s engagement with both intra and extra-UK channels 
of influence has been characterised by its ongoing commitment to the continuation of the 
UK state. The character of Wales as the ͚Good UŶioŶist͛ complements its desire to secure a 
continued position as a ͚Good EuropeaŶ͛.  Wales has preferred a cooperative as opposed to 
combative or disruptive approach towards the UK Government, in a bid to secure a Welsh 
Brexit as part of a ͚one UK Brexit͛.  It has primarily focused advocacy activity at the UK-level, 
seeking to influence aspects both of how the negotiations take place, and who participates, 
as well as the substance of those negotiations and the UK͛s preferences.  The Welsh 
GoǀerŶŵeŶt͛s EU-level activity has instead favoured awareness-raising of Wales͛ particular 
position through private channels, as opposed to more protodiplomatic, public declarations 
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of their distinctiveness from the UK Government as advanced by Scotland (McHarg and 
Mitchell 2017).  Beyond this activity, a large part of its Brussels-based work is centred on 
maximising the benefits of its current EU membership and preparing Wales for its European 
future post-Brexit. 
 
UK intergovernmental relations: Brexit and the union of four nations 
Following an initial outlining and assessment of the existing intergovernmental structures 
within the UK, we detail the dedicated structures put in place in the wake of the 
referendum vote to bring together the different governments to forge a UK position on 
withdrawal going into negotiations. Drawing on interview data, we then present evidence 
about how these structures have been used. 
 
The concepts of self and shared rule are well known from the literature on federalism and 
other forms of multileveled state governance (Elazar 1987; Hooghe et al 2016). The first 
relates to the powers held by the sub-state constituent unit, and its ability to exercise those 
powers independently from the central state. Shared rule meanwhile relates to the 
structures in place for influence over decision-making for the whole state. Federalism, in 
Elazar͛s famous equation, is ͚self-rule plus shared rule͛ (Elazar 1987, 12).  While different 
states adopt different divisions of tasks, certain policy fields are more likely to be reserved 
to the central state – including foreign policy and matters of security and defence. There are 
distinctions too as to the structures for the exercise of self and shared rule that may be in 
place. States differ in the way they protect the sphere of self-rule from incursion from the 
central state, as well as the structures for shared rule, and the degree of voice they give the 
sub-state. Some orders may see the position of the sub-state underpinned by strongly 
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institutionalised structures, protected by constitutional guarantees and backed up by the 
courts. Others, of which the UK is a signal example, see the position of the sub-state rather 
less deeply entrenched in the structures of intergovernmental relations (let alone 
interparliamentary relations), with little in the way of effective legal protections to protect 
areas of self-rule, or to effect joint decision making in areas of common interest.  
 
As the process of devolution in the UK has unfolded, intergovernmental structures have 
been created to facilitate communication and coordination between the UK Government 
and the three devolved nations.  The formalised structure for intergovernmental relations is 
the Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC), a multilateral forum in which Government ministers 
from Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland meet with, and seek to influence the position of, 
their equivalent UK Government Minister. Over the years, the JMC has met with varying 
levels of regularity and, as an effective governance mechanism, appraisals have at best been 
mixed (see for example Gallagher 2012, and Paun and Miller 2016). The operation of the 
JMC across its different formations is based on a Memorandum of Understanding and 
Supplementary Agreements, which set out the procedures and principles for 
intergovernmental relations (these being communication and consultation, co-operation, 
the exchange of information, and confidentiality).  Without statutory underpinning or the 
power to take formally binding decisions, the effectiveness of the JMC is very much open to 
question. There is no obligation on the UK Government to hold these inter-governmental 
meetings, such that the JMC has fallen into extended periods of dormancy.   
 
The European Union JMC (JMC (E)) is considered as the most effective of the three original 
configurations (the other two being JMC Plenary or JMC (P) and JMC (D), dealing with 
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domestic issues).  JMC(E) meets on a regular basis, in advance of European Council 
meetings.  Notably, embedded within this structure is also the possibility for a minister from 
a devolved nation to represent the UK at the EU Council. This development was welcomed 
as a particularly progressive innovation when it was introduced, especially against the 
statutory background which sees relations with the EU as an area of international relations, 
and thus reserved to the central government.  
 
The identification of all EU related activity as reserved to the central government is distinctly 
problematic from a devolved perspective, given the range of policy issues dealt with by the 
EU. Many areas falling within categories where policy competence has been devolved are 
also ones which see extensive EU activity. These include agriculture, the environment, 
fisheries and regional policy. The JMC (E) provides a structure to put into effect the 
commitment in the Concordat on Coordination of European Union Policy Issues (2013) to 
involve devolved administrations ͚as directly and fully as possible in decision making on EU 
ŵatters͛. This commitment goes beyond that found in the Concordat on International 
Relations (2013), which is limited to ensuring ͚Đlose ĐooperatioŶ͛ between the UK 
Government and ministers from the devolved governments in the conduct of international 
relations, reflecting the stronger claims for devolved participation in EU governance 
matters.  
 
The relative success of the JMC (E) may have given the devolved nations some cause for 
optimism that the structures for them to feed into the UK government line on the Article 50 
negotiations would be receptive to their concerns. A new forum – the JMC European 
Negotiations, or JMC (EN) – was convened to deal explicitly with the withdrawal process, for 
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the determination of the whole UK position which the Prime Minister, Theresa May, said 
she sought.  The establishment of the JMC (EN) was announced by the Prime Minister on 24 
October, at a JMC (P) session.  This cross-national forum was to meet on a monthly basis, 
chaired by the UK͛s Secretary of State for Exiting the EU, David Davis (head of the 
Department for Exiting the European Union [DExEU]).  The attending representative from 
Wales was Mark Drakeford (Cabinet Secretary for Finance and Local Government), who 
works in concert with the Welsh First Minister, Carwyn Jones, on Brexit. These actors are 
supported organisationally in the Welsh Government by an EU Transition Team, which was 
established in late summer 2016.  Extensive discussion preceded the announcement of the 
JMC (EN), including the drafting of the JMC ;ENͿ͛s terms of reference.  The devolved 
administrations were included in this process and were satisfied with the terms finally 
agreed, which consist of:  
 
working collaboratively to: discuss each goǀerŶŵeŶt͛s requirements of the future 
relationship with the EU; seek to agree a UK approach to, and objectives for, Article 
50 negotiations; and provide oversight of negotiations with the EU, to ensure, as 
far as possible, that outcomes agreed by all four governments are secured from 
these negotiations; and, discuss issues stemming from the negotiation process 
which may impact upon or have consequences for the UK Government, the Scottish 
Government, the Welsh Government or the Northern Ireland Executive (UK 
Government 2016 – JMC (P)).   
 
Of particular interest was the UK GoǀerŶŵeŶt͛s commitment to ͚seek to agree a UK 
approaĐh͛ to the Article 50 negotiations.  Given the differentiated outcome of the EU 
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Referendum across the UK, and the distinctive relationships between the EU and the 
devolved nations, some interviewees considered it ambitious of the UK Government to have 
made this commitment.  However, as distinct from the practice of the JMC (E), the JMC (EN) 
does not foresee ministers from the devolved administrations participating in the 
negotiations themselves. Unsuccessfully, the Welsh Government has called for a place at 
the negotiating table when devolved issues are being discussed, and otherwise to be in the 
room.  
 
The JMC (EN) met monthly from November 2016 to February 2017.  However, it then did 
not meet for the remainder of the period under study, despite key events taking place, 
including triggering Article 50 notification. This dormancy has met with obvious frustration 
and concern from the Welsh and Scottish Governments.  Furthermore, in operational and 
organisational terms, the JMC (EN) did not function well.  For example, papers were 
received only a day in advance, the location of meetings was sometimes not confirmed until 
the last minute, and the ministerial representation was notably imbalanced, with ͚a cast of 
thousaŶds͛ of ministers, predominantly from across Whitehall, as opposed to a single 
minister from DExEU.  The UK GoǀerŶŵeŶt͛s lacklustre approach to these organisational 
matters was thought to provide an indication of the level of importance it attached to this 
forum; as well as clearly impacting on its potential effectiveness. 
 
During this pre-negotiation phase, the Welsh Government adopted a deliberately 
cooperative and evidence-based approach to intra-UK working, in a bid to secure Wales͛ 
future as part of a ͚one UK Brexit͛.  As one interviewee stated: 
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The constitutional reality is that the UK Government will negotiate our departure from 
the European Union, the UK Government will negotiate the forward relationship 
between the UK and the European Union.  The Welsh Government doesn͛t get to 
negotiate either of those, so our primary task is to try, to the extent that we can, to 
influence the UK Government to properly reflect, recognise and take forward the 
interests of Wales within those negotiations. 
 
This stance reflected their pro-Unionist and pro-devolution position, and also situated them 
in a unique position, as the only devolved administration positioned as a source for ͚like-
minded deďate͛ with the UK Government.  The Welsh GoǀerŶŵeŶt͛s calculations were also 
partly responsible for their emphasis on providing high-quality, intelligent and sensible, 
evidence-based contributions to the UK debate.  The Welsh White Paper, Securing Wales͛ 
Future: Transition from European Union to a New Relationship with Europe of 23 January 
2017 was developed to provide such a contribution, with its preparation seen by some in 
the Welsh Government as an opportunity to test their positions through research and 
analysis. The White Paper, a joint product of the Welsh Government and Plaid Cymru, the 
Party of Wales, reconciled the majority ͚out͛ vote by the Welsh electorate with the position 
of the political majority in the Assembly by arguing that Wales͛ vote to leave the EU was not 
a vote to diminish the Welsh economy, nor for a loss of jobs.  It was on this basis that the 
Welsh Government presented its case for the shape of the UK͛s future relationship with the 
EU, which has at its heart the UK͛s continued participation in the Single Market, including a 
recalibrated, employment-linked freedom of movement, through EFTA membership, or a 
bespoke deal for the UK. Continued membership of the Customs Union was also highlighted 
in the White Paper as being ͚the best position for Welsh and UK ďusiŶess͛.  The Welsh 
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Government invested heavily in the London-based launch of the White Paper, aiming for its 
dissemination across Whitehall, as a constructive (not disruptive) contribution. 
 
Appraisals of the JMC (EN) have judged it to have fallen short of expectations; although, our 
interviewees did not consider it a complete failure.  It was said to have been a helpful 
information exchange mechanism, enabling useful ground to be covered. There were also 
some points where it was considered that the UK Government had listened; there had been 
a ͚good disĐussioŶ͛ of the Welsh GoǀerŶŵeŶt͛s White Paper, for example.  However, this 
communicative benefit was qualified: ͚I think it͛s fair to say that the devolved 
administrations were really a bit unhappy with the JMC (EN). It didn͛t feel like a proper 
exchange.͛ Indeed, another interviewee stated that the JMC (EN) appeared to be, ͚an 
information exchange mechanism, at which [the UK Government] have been quite guarded 
about saying anything to us that hasn͛t been in the public arena͛. 
 
This lack of transparency and consultation was apparent around the issuing of the UK 
GoǀerŶŵeŶt͛s own White Paper on Brexit, which followed the Prime MiŶister͛s Lancaster 
House speech in January 2017.  It was here that the UK Government confirmed its 
preference for leaving both the Single Market and the Customs Union. Neither the UK 
GoǀerŶŵeŶt͛s White Paper, nor the Prime MiŶister͛s Article 50 notification letter of March 
2017 were seen by the devolved administrations in advance of their public release.  This 
exclusion of the devolved administrations was considered indicative (once again) of the 
highly centralised nature of the Brexit process (Hunt 2017). 
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This broader setting was highlighted by an interviewee, who noted that when Theresa May 
took office, she:  
 
… kept her cards close to her chest … so the development of opinion in Whitehall was 
kept very, very, very, very, very tight indeed, so there were even very senior players 
whose job it is to know about UK positions on things like Brexit who frankly knew no 
more than we knew. 
 
Furthermore, the UK Government refused to engage in debate with the devolved 
administrations.  This refusal jarred with the approach adopted by the Welsh Government, 
which sought to contribute to a UK debate.  One interviewee gave us this example: 
 
I think that we as a Welsh Government would have been very open to a proper debate 
and a discussion about [membership of the Customs Union] because we do recognise 
that there are some arguments for not being in the Customs Union, but we would 
have been very open to a debate about that but the UK Government just was not in 
the space of wanting to debate these issues, or didn͛t feel empowered, or the people 
in the room [didn͛t] - however you want to characterise it. It just did not want to have 
that debate and I know that that was a matter of really some frustration to our 
ministers, that that the spirit of debate wasn͛t really there.  
 
Beyond the JMC (EN), at the end of 2016, the Prime Minister also committed to holding 
more than one JMC (P) per year and to holding these outside of London.  As one of our 
interviewees stated, ͚… that was, I think, a psychological moving forward of that process.  It 
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has met twice now actually, and it did of course meet in Cardiff… and I think that was 
symbolically helpful͛.  
 
Intra-UK relations have also been bilateral in nature, between Welsh Government and UK 
Government officials, beginning immediately following the EU Referendum.  Unsurprisingly, 
these initially had an ad hoc quality and, in the first instance, were concentrated where 
bilateral links were already established (for example the UK Cabinet Office, and the 
Department for the Environment, Farming and Rural Affairs [DEFRA]), and between senior 
level officials.  This bilateral communication continued throughout the summer.  Then, with 
the institutional and governance architecture for exiting the EU established (both in Wales 
and at the UK-level), bilateral exchange took place under the more formal structure for 
multilateral working, through the JMC (EN).  Links were established with DExEU and were 
intensified where they already existed.  Communication between the Welsh Government 
and the UK Government officials takes place on a daily basis.  According to one of our 
interviewees, the range of this bilateral contact across departments has never been 
stronger or deeper.  These bilateral relationships are highly valued by the Welsh 
Government.  They are considered useful in gaining a better understanding of how to frame 
interventions to influence more effectively the UK Government.  However, this strategic 
framing does not guarantee successful policy influence. 
 
Bilateral exchanges also take place at ministerial level, such as in advance of JMC (EN) 
meetings.  However, given that power is highly centralised in the UK Government, it was 
questioned whether this communication led to influence.  With respect to Special Advisors, 
there is limited cross-national interaction, due to different parties leading all four 
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governments in the UK.  Finally, there is also bilateral and trilateral working between the 
devolved administrations themselves, excluding London; however, this exchange has been 
restricted due to the contrasting political positions between the Scottish and Welsh 
Governments.  Indeed, the amount of bilateral working decreased following the Scottish 
GoverŶŵeŶt͛s call on 13 March 2017 for a second referendum on SĐotlaŶd͛s independence 
from the UK.   
 
The Welsh Government claims to have influenced (with other actors) UK Government 
language and thinking on Brexit: first, regarding the UK GoǀerŶŵeŶt͛s preference for 
͚friĐtioŶless access to the Single Market͛ (mirroring the Welsh GoǀerŶŵeŶt͛s construction of 
͚full and unfettered aĐĐess͛Ϳ; and, secondly, in seeking an ͚implementation phase͛ (or a 
͚transition period͛, as promoted by the Welsh Government).  In these two cases, the Welsh 
Government asserts that their contributions served to open these possibilities to the UK 
Government. 
 
Taken together however, the intra-UK structures for the devolved administrations to 
influence UK foreign policy in this area have proven rather weak and ineffective.  There is 
little evidence to indicate that the devolved administrations have succeeded in getting their 
policy priorities accepted, nor has there been a positive response from the UK Government 
to their requests to be included at the table once negotiations begin.  The process is highly 
centralised, and without the political will at a more senior level to seek meaningful benefit 
from this cross-national forum. The recognised systemic weaknesses within the JMC 
frameworks have carried forward into the new formation, and the structures are 
inadequate to counter political intransigence from the centre. Nevertheless, Wales has 
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focused energies on influencing the UK Government through intra-UK working, including the 
JMC (EN).  It has adopted a cooperative approach, emphasising its distinctive position as a 
well-placed interlocutor for the UK Government, and concentrating on providing evidence-
based contributions to the UK debate.   
 
Sub-state Paradiplomacy and the Brexit Process 
In this section we explore the EU-level opportunity structures for Wales to assert its own 
policy preferences and how Wales has engaged with them. We start with the observation 
that sub-states are increasingly foreign policy actors.  The drivers behind such activity may 
be political, cultural and economic (Keating 1999), and may be attached to nation building 
(Hocking 1999) as sub-states seek to assert and legitimise a distinct national identity beyond 
the state.  In turn, there will be a strengthening of the internal conceptualisation of 
nationhood.  Such paradiplomatic activity is premised on two features of contemporary 
territorial politics.  The first is the legal and political capacity of the sub-state, including the 
(mis-) match in policy competence between the internal and external dimensions of a policy 
area.  The second is the regional or international opportunity structure (specifically the 
institutional architecture) for sub-state activity (Lecours 2001; Royles 2017). In response to 
this opportunity structure, sub-states build capacity (international and domestic), so as to 
enhance their international presence.  
 
Within the UK, the devolved nations have a developing record of promoting their interests 
on the international stage. The devolved nations have been especially active beyond the 
nation state in the context of the EU and its governance structures. The EU provides a 
particularly amenable set of structures with which the sub-state may engage. These include 
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certain territorially defined posts in the EU institutions, such as members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs), the Economic and Social Committee, and especially, the Committee of 
the Regions (CoR). Sub-state engagement extends much further however. Responding to 
the opportunity structure provided by Brussels, sub-states both from within the EU - such as 
Brittany, Baden-Württemberg and Flanders - and beyond (notably Québec) operate regional 
offices.  These offices undertake a range of functions, including policy influence, intelligence 
gathering, profile raising, and networking and relationship building with European, regional 
and EU institutional actors (Tatham 2008, 2016). Wales, along with Scotland and Northern 
Ireland, have their own regional presence in Brussels, with a combined base in ͚Wales 
House͛ for the Welsh Government, the National Assembly, Higher Education Wales and the 
Welsh Local Government Association.  
 
Whilst some intergovernmental working between the different governments of the UK 
takes place in Brussels, this Brussels-based work acts as a complement to UK-based activity 
which is firmly the principal site.  The devolved nations enjoy regular formal and informal 
contact with the UK͛s Permanent Representation to the EU (UKREP), and appraisals of 
UK‘EP͛s receptivity to devolved sensitives are positive.  This relationship contrasts with the 
sometimes less easy relationship between the devolved administrations and the UK 
Government at home.   
 
In addition, there is an array of different networks headquartered in Brussels, specifically 
geared towards connecting a range of different regional actors, which see the involvement 
of the UK devolved nations. These include the Conference of Regions with Legislative 
Assemblies; Conference of Peripheral and Maritime Regions (CPMR); European Regions for 
18 
Research and Innovation; Network of Regional Governments for Sustainable Development; 
Cine Regions (a network of regional film funds) and the European Network of National Civil 
Society.  Notably, each also has a membership that extends beyond EU member states. 
 
Together, these institutions and networks, both formal and informal, might combine to 
provide Wales and the other devolved nations with a range of opportunity structures to 
advance their distinct interests in the Brexit process.  As the ultimate expression of nation 
state sovereignty, however, the UK͛s decision to withdraw from the EU is clearly understood 
by its EU partners as a matter for the UK Government.  No formal channel has been 
foreseen by the EU for the devolved administrations to engage directly in the upcoming 
negotiations. That said, there is clear evidence that the way in which the process is being 
managed by the EU (particularly the European Commission and Parliament) affords some 
scope for the acknowledgement of interests beyond those expressed by the nation state 
government. The regionally-responsive structures seen across EU governance present a 
range of opportunities for Wales, along with the other devolved nations, to present their 
concerns.  
 
Looking first to the EU institutions, the European Parliament, despite enjoying a limited 
formal role in the Article 50 process, has under Brexit-lead MEP Guy Verhofstadt 
undertaken extensive research and consultation across a range of policy areas. Whilst the 
rights of citizens have been front and centre of its activity, space has been afforded to the 
consideration of regions and sub-national territories, including those in the UK.  Indeed, the 
ParliaŵeŶt͛s Constitutional Affairs Committee has been very active in producing policy 
briefs and hosting hearings with a diverse range of actors.  In January 2017, representatives 
19 
from Scotland and Gibraltar appeared at a hearing; and in April 2017 the Committee shared 
a commissioned policy brief on the implications of Brexit across the Scotland, Wales and 
Gibraltar (European Parliament 2017).  Furthermore, as a former Belgian Prime Minister, 
Verhofstadt is well-versed in the dynamics of sub-state politics. 
 
The European CoŵŵissioŶ͛s Chief Negotiator, Michel Barnier, is also fully literate in regional 
politics, given his own background in French regional politics and having served as European 
Commissioner for Regional Policy.  It was also said by one interviewee that ͚Barnier knows 
Wales and knows something of opinion [in Wales] and of the nuances of Wales… so there is 
that degree of empathy there͛.  Furthermore, one of BarŶier͛s first public interventions as 
Chief Negotiator was at a Plenary meeting of the CoR, where the Co‘͛s Resolution on Brexit 
was approved (Committee of the Regions 2017).  This regional sensitivity is complemented 
by BarŶier͛s broad approach to the Brexit process, which is very open to consultation and 
engagement with a range of stakeholders. 
 
Beyond the institutional architecture provided by the EU, regional actors from the EU27 
member states have highlighted the potential regional impacts of Brexit independently.  For 
example, Flanders released a press statement the day after the EU Referendum (Minister-
President Office of Flanders 2016); and one of the more established regional networks 
based in Brussels, CPMR, called for sensitivity to the regional dimension of Brexit (CPMR 
2017).  Laying the EU͛s open approach to the Brexit negotiations over a political landscape 
that is sensitive to the expression of regional interests has afforded space to regional actors 
(from the EU27 and the UK) to express their distinctive positions on Brexit. In particular, 
Scotland moved swiftly to highlight to the EU institutions and EU27 the distinctions between 
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its position and that of the UK Government, with early visits to Brussels by First Minister 
Nicola Sturgeon to scope a differentiated settlement for Scotland (Thomas 2016).  
 
As for Wales, the Welsh GoverŶŵeŶt͛s Brussels Office has so far undertaken multiple tasks 
in the context of the UK͛s withdrawal from the EU, aside from discharging the Welsh 
GoǀerŶŵeŶt͛s continued EU-related responsibilities.  These Brexit-specific tasks encompass 
intelligence gathering, awareness-raising, and network/partnership-building; the first two of 
which are more directly related to the withdrawal process, and the latter of which is more 
directly related to Wales͛ European future post-Brexit.  In all its activity, the Brussels Office 
works with the Cardiff-based EU Transition Team (which leads on matters relating to exit 
and post-exit), and with policy-specific teams across the Welsh Government.  Whilst 
Brussels and Cardiff are in regular communication, aside from requests for specific 
information or logistical assistance in the case of ministerial visits to Brussels, the Brussels 
Office leads on its own agenda of work. 
 
In the context of Brexit, the Brussels Office has a two-pronged intelligence gathering role to 
play.  First, they are Cardiff͛s ͚eǇes and ears͛: 
 
… certainly [the Brussels office] is now and will continue to operate as an antennae 
for us, as a listening post.  The office in Brussels is now keeping up with the various 
twists and turns of negotiations, they are well-placed to provide analysis of the 
formal exchanges of documents, and press conferences and culmination of opinion 
which is now happening thick and fast in Brussels, and [providing] accompanying 
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analysis to that which is really, really useful to us in terms of having our own source 
of intelligence… 
 
It was only following the triggering of Article 50 that this work began in earnest, given the 
discipline of the EU institutions and the EU27 Member States in strictly limiting Brexit-
related commentary before this time.  In addition, there are requests for policy-specific 
information to support Wales͛ preparations for life post-Brexit.  Given the extensive, 
international networks enjoyed by the Brussels Office, they are well-placed to collect 
information about how other regions address specific policy issues, such as immigration. 
 
In terms of awareness-raising, there are two strands to the role of the Brussels Office.  The 
first is the supporting role it plays when there are ministerial visits to Brussels.  Secondly, 
the Brussels Office has worked to raise awareness of Wales͛ distinct Brexit position.  As one 
interviewee stated: 
 
They͛ve got a … role which is to work with others, with MEPs, with the Committee of 
the Regions, with other Regional Offices, with UKREP and other players in Brussels to 
help a better understanding of the specifically Welsh perspectives as expressed in the 
White Paper – so that͛s been distributed far and wide in Brussels and our office has a 
role in promoting an understanding of that. 
 
To this end, the Brussels Office mobilises within its networks.  As part of this process, the 
European Parliament has been identified as a key institution: 
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The institution which is most open to us [highlighting our position] is the European 
Parliament because it has a plurality of members, it isn͛t just a single front door. We 
have done work, and the ministers have been out to speak to MEPs, and I suspect we 
will do more of that in the future - as the European Parliament gets a vote on the 
future [withdrawal agreement]. 
 
In this activity, the emphasis is upon constructive awareness-raising; as opposed to more 
disruptive advocacy work.  The approach taken to the launch of the Welsh GoǀerŶŵeŶt͛s 
White Paper provides a useful example of this approach.  The Brussels Office led on its 
dissemination across its Brussels-based networks; predominantly through personal email 
communication.  In stark contrast to the Scottish Government, the Welsh Government did 
not host any high profile events in Brussels to publicise its paper, but instead concentrated 
efforts on a launch in London. 
 
There have also been ministerial visits to Brussels since the EU Referendum.  These have 
seen, for example, Mark Drakeford, meet with politicians and officials from the European 
Parliament, including the Chair of the Constitutional Affairs Committee (Danuta Hübner).  
This Chair suggested that the Welsh Government might give evidence to the Committee (as 
the Scottish Government and the Government of Gibraltar did in January 2017).  The Welsh 
Government is likely to cultivate this link, as it has identified the European Parliament as 
potentially the most effective route in to highlighting their distinctive position.  They have 
already held meetings with senior Commission officials, and these are scheduled to 
continue, including a meeting with Michel Barnier in summer 2017. 
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The Welsh GoǀerŶŵeŶt͛s approach to its Brussels-based activity acknowledges that the UK 
Government is the formal interlocutor for EU matters. However, ͚the expression of our 
positions can provide part of the backdrop, part of the colour, and a sense that opinion 
across the United Kingdom is certainly not uniform͛. 
 
Through their Brussels-based activity, the Welsh Government seeks to ensure that the EU 
institutions understand that ͛whatever views put forward by the UK Government does not 
represent a whole and a uniform position of the UK as a whole͛.  In so doing, it is not seeking 
to challenge the status of the UK as the negotiating nation state, but asserting that there are 
different perspectives across the UK.  As one interviewee stated: 
 
I think that probably the European institutions will have an understanding that there 
are different shades of opinion across different part of the UK, but of course, the 
reality is that it is the UK Government that will take forward the negotiating position 
in that formal context. 
 
Finally, much of the Welsh GoǀerŶŵeŶt͛s work in Brussels since the referendum vote has 
been with an eye to future relations post-Brexit.  
 
… one of the things that we [the Welsh Government] are very clear about is that 
withdrawing from the European Union, does not mean that Wales is pulling out of 
Europe. Wales is absolutely not pulling out of Europe, we are remaining part of 
Europe, even though we will not be part of the European Union in two years from 
now, presumably … so maintaining relationships with friends, neighbours, 
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colleagues in Brussels - and Brussels is the place to do it because that͛s where all 
of Europe comes together - that remains important to us so we are continuing to 
work with our networks, and our friends and colleagues, with a view to trying to 
retain relationships, albeit in a different context… 
 
Unsurprisingly, the Brussels Office has a key role to play in this regard.  There are two 
strands to this work.  The first is the continued investment in cross-national networks and 
partnerships; both as a benefit in and of itself as well as demonstrating Wales͛ commitment 
to international activity.  As an interviewee noted, ͚If we͛re, as a Government, saying in our 
Brexit White Paper, yes, we want to cooperate transnationally, afterwards [after Brexit], we 
have got to demonstrate that we͛re doing it now͛.   
 
The second strand is intelligence gathering and analysis.  This activity has included scoping 
activity surrounding the involvement of Welsh actors in European networks (beyond the 
EU).  Furthermore, the Brussels Office follows EU-level developments across a range of 
policy areas, which feeds into domestic work.  For example, in tracking European regional 
policy, Wales can gauge the level of expected funding were the UK to remain within the EU.  
This information is valuable when Wales calls for an appropriate financial contribution to 
regional policy.  Furthermore, Wales will also maintain a firm understanding of the policies 
of its soon-to-be European neighbour (as opposed to partner), which will impact on the 
British and Welsh economy, such as in the area of steel and agriculture. 
 
Whilst there are no formal channels for Wales to influence the Brexit negotiations, the EU 
provides an opportunity structure that is hospitable to the articulation of regional interests.  
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Within these structures, Wales has not asserted itself forcefully; instead preferring to 
increase understanding of the Welsh position, without challenge to the UK GoǀerŶŵeŶt͛s 
primacy in the Brexit negotiations. 
 
Analysis: Wales within and outwith state 
The findings from our research highlight the weakness of the formal intra-UK structure for 
Wales to influence UK Government policy on Brexit, although this structure overlays 
frequent and useful bilateral interactions. At an EU level, there are no formal structures for 
sub-states to influence the negotiations. However, the institutional architecture around, 
and the approach taken to, Brexit are certainly hospitable to representation from sub-
states.  There are differences and similarities in the ways in which Wales has engaged with 
these internal and external structures.  The primary difference is in the level of attention 
afforded to these two sites.  Indeed, the Welsh Government has prioritised policy influence 
within the UK (and not at an EU level) despite the weakness of the intergovernmental 
machinery.  In both cases, however, the approach of the Welsh Government has been 
characterised by a spirit of cooperation, as opposed to disruption.  Unlike Scotland, Wales is 
seeking to secure a Welsh Brexit as part of a ͚one UK Brexit͛.  These finding negate our 
hypothesis that, if the intra-UK structures were found to be unsatisfactory, Wales would 
actively pursue policy influence beyond the state.  In turn, this raises the question of why 
Wales has adopted this strategy.  We explore this question below, advancing two 
explanatory factors. 
 
We argue that the nature of the Welsh GoverŶŵeŶt͛s engagement with the structures both 
within and beyond the state casts Wales as a ͚Good UŶioŶist͛ on the one hand, and a ͚Good 
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EuropeaŶ͛ on the other.  These dual principles have informed the Welsh GoǀerŶŵeŶt͛s 
activity in the pre-negotiation phase of the Brexit process. 
 
This activity played out in two, overlapping ways.  First, whilst the Scottish Government has 
promoted the future of Scotland outside the UK, and prioritised a differential arrangement 
with the EU, Wales sought to secure a Welsh Brexit as part of a ͚one UK Brexit͛.  As a ͚Good 
UŶioŶist͛ Wales occupied a lone position amongst the devolved administrations.  The Welsh 
Government aimed to capitalise on this unique position, presenting itself as a ͚like-ŵiŶded͛ 
interlocutor for the UK Government and preparing itself to play this role through the 
provision of evidence-based contributions.  Indeed, it has emphasised the provision of 
evidence-based (as opposed to political) contributions to the UK debate, in the spirit of 
partnership working.  Secondly, the ͚Good UŶioŶist͛ principle informed the more 
cooperative approach espoused by the Welsh Government.  In the promotion of its own 
distinct policy preferences, Wales has focused efforts on highlighting areas of 
complementarity and potential overlap with the UK Government; publicising areas of 
potential common ground and successful joint working, and highlighting differences 
privately.  In contrast with the Scottish Government, it has not been combative in its 
interactions with the UK Government, only latterly becoming more strident in articulating 
its dissatisfaction with the intergovernmental machinery for the Article 50 negotiations.   
 
While we argue that this cooperative approach is a reflection of Wales͛ pro-Unionism, it can 
also be viewed in light of Wales͛ poor bargaining hand within the UK as well as the current 
political constellation of the Welsh and UK Governments.  In terms of bargaining power, 
unlike Scotland (that has called for a second independence referendum) (McHarg and 
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Mitchell 2017) and Northern Ireland (whose particular situation demands attention) 
(Gormley-Heenan and Aughey 2017), Wales has little leverage against the UK Government.  
Beyond this disparity, with different political parties dominating in London and Cardiff, there 
is little to no scope for informal intergovernmental working through party machinery.  It is 
unsurprising, then, that Wales would seek healthy working relations with central 
government.   
 
This ͚Good UŶioŶist͛ principle has also characterised the Welsh GoǀerŶŵeŶt͛s pre-
negotiation Brussels-based activity.  Against a rich backdrop open to the representation of 
different perspectives on Brexit, the Welsh Government has not undertaken high-profile 
advocacy work to publicise its distinctive position.  Instead, it has preferred to raise 
awareness of the Welsh perspective behind closed doors.  A clear contrast can be drawn 
between Wales and Scotland in this regard.  Scotland has been more combative and 
disruptive, using the EU stage to pursue its independence agenda, in a clear display of 
protodiplomacy. 
 
Parallel to its profiling as a ͚Good UŶioŶist͛ is the Welsh GoǀerŶŵeŶt͛s desire that Wales 
remains a ͚Good EuropeaŶ͛.  This principle has underpinned the Welsh GoǀerŶŵeŶt͛s 
Brussels-based activity; both the activity relating to the Brexit negotiations themselves and 
also, crucially, to Wales͛ relationship with the EU post-Brexit.  The Brussels Office has played 
both an intelligence gathering and a diplomatic role in this regard.  As a ͚Good EuropeaŶ͛, 
the Welsh GoǀerŶŵeŶt͛s objective has been to ensure that Wales is in a position to 
maximise its participation in political networks, bilateral and multilateral partnerships, and 
collaborative ventures post-Brexit. 
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As a final point, it is useful to set Wales as the ͚Good UŶioŶist͛ and the ͚Good EuropeaŶ͛ 
against the UK͛s current devolution landscape.  The UK͛s withdrawal from the EU provides 
us with a case where the political agendas and positions of the devolved nations leave little 
scope for cross-national working.  Thematically there is certainly overlap between them 
regarding, for example, the relationship with the Single Market, the Customs Union, and 
immigration.  However, as it stands, the Scottish Government is invested in its future 
independence from the UK, Northern Ireland is currently without an executive, and the 
Welsh Government remains pro-Unionist without a public mandate to advocate its 
preferred Brexit agenda.  
 
Conclusion 
The UK͛s membership of and withdrawal from the European Union is a matter of UK foreign 
policy.  This is the case despite the distinct relationships that have developed between the 
EU and the devolved nations, and the territorially differentiated impact that Brexit will have 
across the UK.  Indeed, turning to our case, the UK Government and the Welsh Government 
have contrasting Brexit preferences; the former preferring to leave both the Single Market 
and the Customs Union, and the latter preferring continued participation in both. 
 
From this starting point, our article sought to identify and explore the structures by which 
Wales as a sub-state of the UK could seek to influence the course of the Brexit negotiations 
and how Wales has engaged with them.  We considered the structures both within and 
beyond the state; hypothesising that in the case of limited opportunity for influence 
through intra-UK structures, Wales would focus efforts in the EU arena itself.  Through 
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documentary analysis and interview data, we built a picture of these structures for sub-state 
influence, the effectiveness of these structures, and the ways in which Wales had engaged 
with them during the pre-negotiation phase of the Brexit process.  Our hypothesis was 
disproved. 
 
We argue that in its Brexit activity, Wales can be usefully characterised as both a ͚Good 
UnioŶist͛ and a ͚Good EuropeaŶ͛.  Within the UK, we saw Wales participating in a 
collaborative and constructive manner in what was a relatively weak intergovernmental 
process.  Beyond the UK, and in contrast to their Scottish counter-parts, the Welsh 
Government did not pursue any high-profile publicity of its distinctive position, but instead 
sought primarily to raise awareness more quietly, through direct communication.  Despite 
its limitations, the Welsh Government targeted the UK-level as the site to influence the 
negotiations; seeking a Welsh Brexit as part of a ͚one UK Brexit͛.  Activity in Brussels has 
included raising awareness of the Welsh perspective; not in a bid to challenge the UK 
GoǀerŶŵeŶt͛s primacy in negotiations but in order to assert the multiple perspectives on 
Brexit in the UK.  Beyond this work, much Brussels-based activity is underway to maintain 
Wales͛ profile as a ͚Good EuropeaŶ͛ post-Brexit. 
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